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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner Ramiro Aguilar-Rivera seeks review of a decision by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his motion to reopen removal 
proceedings.1  For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied in part and 
dismissed in part. 
I. 
Petitioner, a native of Mexico, first entered the United States on or about 
September 11, 1996.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) (formerly the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service) initiated removal proceedings on October 8, 
1997 by filing a Notice to Appear, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  The 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the removability charge and granted Petitioner 
voluntary departure.  Petitioner returned to Mexico.   
Petitioner reentered the United States without inspection in February 2010.  He 
was issued an expedited removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) on February 5, 2010 
and was removed to Mexico.  
On July 8, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the proceedings in order to 
apply for asylum and withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3), and protection pursuant to the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Petitioner claimed that changed country 
 
1 Petitioner captioned his motion as a “Motion to Reopen in Absentia Proceeding” but the 
BIA concluded that he was not ordered to be removed in absentia, so we will simply refer 




conditions warranted reopening of his proceedings.  Specifically, he asserted that 
following his expedited removal order in 2010, cartel violence increased in his home 
region of Mexico, and he and his family suffered harassment and persecution from 
Mexican drug cartels.  Petitioner alleged Mexican customs officials turned him over to 
cartel members in 2011, who kidnapped him and tortured him, dislocated his arm, and 
broke his leg.  He also claimed that his daughter was kidnapped by the cartel in 2013 and 
held for ransom, and that his son was beaten by a group of people the same year because 
of his relationship with Petitioner.  
In support, Petitioner submitted affidavits from his wife, aunt and brother-in-law 
explaining that he was kidnapped in November 2011, as well as a police report indicating 
his wife had reported him as missing in Mexico.  He submitted a medical report from 
March 2012 that described a history of an elbow dislocation but “no evidence of an acute 
fracture or dislocation” and “chronic changes, probable [sic] from an old injury.”  R. 186.  
He also submitted articles regarding the increasing violence of Mexican cartels and a 
police report from the Alton, Texas police department explaining that he reported his 
daughter’s kidnapping but the police could not investigate it given that the kidnapping 
occurred in Mexico and his daughter was a Mexican national.     
The IJ denied Petitioner’s Motion to Reopen on August 27, 2019.  The IJ 
determined that Petitioner’s evidence failed to “sufficiently corroborate [Petitioner’s] 
claim” and failed to show he was likely to be granted relief.  The IJ faulted Petitioner 
because neither his son nor his daughter submitted an affidavit describing their abuse 




affidavit from the name used in the police complaint and his wife’s affidavit, and 
Petitioner’s medical evidence did not support his claimed injuries.  The IJ explained that, 
without corroboration, Petitioner could not meet his high burden of showing materially 
changed circumstances that would warrant a reopening under 8 C.F.R § 1003.23(b)(3).   
Petitioner appealed to the BIA, which dismissed his petition on June 2, 2020.  The 
BIA agreed that Petitioner failed to corroborate his claims and thus, failed to establish 
“he [was] prima facie eligible for relief.”  R. 6.   
The BIA explained that when the IJ determines corroborating evidence is needed, 
the party must provide such evidence or show they do not have it and cannot reasonably 
obtain it.  Petitioner did not claim that he could not reasonably obtain affidavits from his 
son or daughter or that they were not available.  The BIA also rejected Petitioner’s claim 
that the IJ misunderstood the different names used for Petitioner’s daughter.  The BIA 
reiterated the IJ’s determination that the medical report supported that the dislocation was 
the result of “an old injury.”  R. 6.  The BIA thus concluded that Petitioner had not 
provided evidence of country conditions that “materially bear[] on his claim” and that he 
did not provide sufficient evidence to corroborate his claim that he and his family would 
be targeted in Mexico.  R. 6.  Petitioner filed a timely petition for judicial review. 
II. 
The BIA had jurisdiction over Petitioner’s motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R.  





We review the BIA’s findings of fact to determine whether they were supported 
by substantial evidence, and its ultimate decision to reject the motion to reopen for an 
abuse of discretion.  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under 
the abuse of discretion standard, we will reverse the BIA’s decision if it is “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Id. at 174.  The Supreme Court has recognized that “[T]he 
Attorney General has ‘broad discretion’ to grant or deny such motions.  Motions for 
reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored[.]”  INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 
323 (1992) (citations omitted).   
III. 
 Petitioner argues that the BIA abused its discretion by holding him to a higher 
burden of proof than required at the motion to reopen stage and by failing to provide him 
with advance notice of the need to provide corroborating evidence.  We conclude that the 
first argument is without merit and the second is not properly before us.   
A. 
 A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be 
held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary 
material.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  If the motion is submitted for the purpose of 
applying for relief, as in this case, it must include the “application for relief and all 
supporting documentation.”  Id.  The motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the 
Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not 
have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”  Id.  The BIA may deny a 




a prima facie case for the relief sought”; (2) “the movant has failed to introduce 
previously unavailable, material evidence that justifies reopening, as required by 
regulation”; or (3) as matter of discretion, the movant is not entitled to relief.  Sevoian, 
290 F.3d at 169–70. 
We review only the decision of the BIA, and not the IJ, unless the BIA’s decision 
“specifically reference[s] or adopt[s] other portions of the IJ’s analysis.”  Voci v. 
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, the IJ concluded that Petitioner did 
not provide sufficient evidence to meet his burden to show changed circumstances 
warranting a reopening under 8 C.F.R.§ 1003.23(b)(3), but the BIA concluded that the 
lack of sufficient evidence meant that Petitioner did not show that he was prima facie 
eligible for relief.  These are two related but distinct issues.  See Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 
503 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2007).  Because the BIA did not address the changed 
circumstances analysis, we review only whether the BIA abused its discretion in 
concluding that Petitioner did not present a prima facie case for asylum or relief under the 
CAT in his motion to reopen.   
Petitioner argues that the BIA abused its discretion in requiring him to “prove” the 
new facts alleged in his motion to reopen.  While we agree that the BIA was unclear as to 
whether it accepted the truth of Petitioner’s allegations, we conclude that this did not 
constitute abuse of discretion because his allegations are insufficient to make a prima 
facie case.  
  To establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought in a motion to reopen, the 




[Petitioner] can establish [that he is entitled to relief].”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 
563 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended (Dec. 3, 2004) (citing Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 173, 175).  
This standard is less rigorous than the standard at a proceeding on the merits, which 
requires the alien to establish eligibility for relief, but Petitioner nonetheless must provide 
enough evidence with the motion to reopen to show “a realistic chance” that he will be 
entitled to relief.  Id. at 564.   
Petitioner is seeking to reopen proceedings so he can apply for asylum and 
protection under the CAT.  For his asylum claim, he must show that he has “a well-
founded fear of persecution.”  Shardar, 503 F.3d at 312.  For relief under the CAT, he 
must show that he will be able to establish “that it is more likely than not that he [] would 
be tortured if removed” to Mexico.  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174–75 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(2)).  “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment” “by or at the 
instigation of” a public official for “purposes such as obtaining confessions, punishment, 
intimidation or coercion.” See id. at 175 (internal citations omitted). 
In determining whether the BIA abused its discretion, we must ask “whether the 
[B]oard followed proper procedures and considered and appraised the material evidence 
before it.”  Id. at 177.  Prima facie scrutiny entails consideration of “the evidence that 
accompanies the motion as well as relevant evidence that may exist in the record of the 
prior hearing, in light of the applicable statutory requirements for relief.”  Id. at 173.   
Here, the BIA considered the evidence and concluded that it was insufficient 




because he and his family have been harassed, kidnapped, and tortured by Mexican drug 
cartels.   
In support of his claim that his family was under threat, Petitioner averred that his 
son was beaten by cartel members and that his daughter was kidnapped in 2013.  He 
failed to provide an affidavit from either his son or his daughter, and the record contains 
inconsistent names for his daughter.  The BIA was entitled to give limited weight to this 
evidence given the lack of detail and inconsistencies.  See Fei Yan Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 
F.3d 268, 275 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that the BIA “may give whatever weight it 
deems appropriate to [authentic and relevant] evidence in light of all of the other 
evidence presented”).  
 None of the background materials support that Petitioner or his family face “a 
particularized threat of persecution” as required by asylum applicants or that he is more 
likely than not to suffer from torture.  See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 316; Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 
174–75.  The background information only refers to the general dangerousness and 
growth of the cartels in his home region.  The BIA evaluated this evidence and concluded 
that Petitioner, “has not explained which country conditions evidence ‘materially bear[] 
on his claim’ and was ignored.”  R. 6.  Under the substantial evidence standard, we 
cannot conclude “that a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find to the 
contrary.”  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 175. 
Petitioner additionally claims that he was kidnapped and beaten by the cartel and, 
as a result, suffered from a dislocated elbow and broken leg.  However, his medical report 




were only “chronic changes, probable [sic] from an old injury.”  R. 186.  The only 
evidence of a broken leg was an undated photograph of him allegedly receiving treatment 
from the Red Cross for a leg injury.  The BIA considered this evidence along with 
affidavits from Petitioner’s family members which explained that he was kidnapped.  We 
conclude that the BIA “weighed the evidence and found it lacking, and thus made a 
factual finding about [Petitioner’s] claim.”  See Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 175.   
Petitioner makes no argument that the BIA “ignore[d] evidence favorable to” him.  
Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010).  The BIA correctly explained that 
Petitioner was required to show “a reasonable likelihood” that he was entitled to relief.  
Guo, 386 F.3d at 563.  The BIA then “reviewed the record[,] grasped [his] claims,” and 
concluded that he failed to meet the prima facie standard because he did not show that he 
or his family were targeted in Mexico.  See Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 178; R. 6, 7.  
We acknowledge, however, that the BIA’s use of term “corroboration” at the 
motion to reopen stage is confusing.  The BIA explained that “[o]ther than arguing 
generally that the Immigration Judge ignored relevant evidence, the respondent does not 
specify the evidence submitted that would further corroborate his claim that he and his 
family were targeted in Mexico.”  R. 6.  To the extent that the BIA’s decision rested on a 
rejection of the veracity of Petitioner’s claims, rather than on giving the evidence limited 
weight, this was in error.  See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313.  But, regardless, this does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion because Petitioner’s allegations are insufficient to make 
a prima facie showing of persecution or torture.  See Tilija v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 165, 




because of their opposition to the cartel is insufficient to make a prima facie showing of 
persecution.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Such ordinary 
criminal activity does not rise to the level of persecution necessary to establish eligibility 
for asylum.”).  And he does not allege that he was or will be tortured “by or at the 
instigation of” a public official for “purposes such as obtaining confessions, punishment, 
intimidation or coercion,” as required for CAT relief.  See Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 175.  We 
cannot conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal.  We will 
deny his petition for review.  
B. 
As for Petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to notice to provide corroborating 
evidence, he did not raise this issue in his brief before the BIA, and therefore we are 
without jurisdiction to review it.  An alien must “raise and exhaust all remedies available 
to her in order to preserve her right to appellate review of a final order of removal.”  Yan 
Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005).  We have explained that this is a 
liberal requirement, in which the petitioner must “make[] some effort, however 
insufficient, to place the Board on notice of a straightforward issue being raised on 
appeal.”  Id. at 422.  On appeal to the BIA, Petitioner argued that he had provided 
sufficient evidence to corroborate his claims.  He did not argue that he was entitled to 
advance notice from the IJ that corroborating evidence was required.  While the BIA 
explained that the IJ had the authority to require corroborating evidence, the BIA did not 




aware that there was a possible claim of error regarding notice.  See id. at 422.  As such, 
we are without jurisdiction to review this issue.  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, Aguilar-Rivera’s petition for review will be denied in 
part and dismissed in part. 
